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1. Background and Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, Brazil has been building a new water resource management 
system, with the river basin as the territorial unit for planning and management. New 
water legislation was first approved in the state of São Paulo in the early 1990s, followed 
by Ceará in 1992 and subsequently several other states. The National Water Law, 
approved in 1997, confirmed that Brazilian water management had entered a new era, 
embracing the main aspects of the new approach taken by the states that pioneered reform 
in the sector. These laws were based on a series of principles, in consonance with those 
recommended by major international charters such as the Dublin Statement of 1991, i.e. 
sectoral integration, decentralization of water management to the river basin level, the 
participation of stakeholders, and the concept of water as an economic good while 
guaranteeing priority for human consumption. With some variations, the Brazilian 
national and state water laws included the creation of two new river basin management 
institutions, largely based on the French experience: stakeholder committees and water 
agencies, the “executive arm” of these committees. The laws also created a new water 
management instrument: bulk water charges, which would give financial autonomy to the 
new basin institutions. The concession and control of water user rights remain under the 
jurisdiction of either federal or state governments, since under the Brazilian Constitution 
of 1988, waters that cross state or international boundaries are in federal jurisdiction, 
while those located entirely within the territory of a single state as well groundwater 
resources are in state domain
2.  
  One of the most advanced cases of water management reform in Brazil is 
occurring in the state of Ceará, in the semi-arid northeastern region of the country. 
Among the poorest states of the country, characterized by a patriarchal political culture 
and extreme socio-economic inequalities, with a state government inexperienced in water 
management, Ceará would not have been a likely place to expect advances in promoting 
decentralized stakeholder models of water management. But, based on a more centralized 
model of water management than that proposed by the national water law, Ceará state has 
involved large numbers of stakeholders in key water management questions and created a 
state water management agency and decentralized institutions that are impressively 
strong, considering the context within which they grew.   
  These changes have gone furthest in the Jaguaribe River Basin, the subject of this 
Working Paper, which is part of an international study of experiences in decentralizing 
integrated water management to the lowest appropriate level. The larger study, supported 
by the World Bank, seeks to evaluate the extent to which river basin management efforts 
have been successful and to identify the factors that can be associated with both positive 
and negative outcomes. An important consideration in this context is that “the lowest 
appropriate level” for integrated river basin management varies between countries, states 
and even basins. For this reason, the methodology necessarily needs to take into account 
the hydrological, socio-economic, cultural and historical conditions in the case study 
                                                 
2 One major exception is also established in the 1988 Constitution: state waters collected in or regulated by 
federal structures are under federal jurisdiction. This norm is especially relevant in the semi-arid 
Northeast, where the majority of reservoirs were built by federal agencies in charge of drought prevention 
policies and programs.  -  -  5
areas. The present research project explores these factors both through a survey of river 
basin organizations throughout the world and case studies of eight river basins, namely 
the Murray Darling River basin in Australia, the Fraser basin in Canada, the Tárcoles 
basin in Costa Rica, the Brantas basin in Indonesia, the Warta basin of Poland, the 
Guadalquivir basin in Spain, and the Alto Tietê and Jaguaribe basins in Brazil.  
  In the next two sections, the analytical framework and methodology of the study 
are presented. The paper then goes on to describe the physical aspects of the Jaguaribe 
basin, the institutional arrangements that have been created there, and the role of 
stakeholders in these institutions. It then further examines these changes through the lens 
of the analytical framework presented. This involves looking at how a series of factors 
affect the evolution of decentralization, such as initial conditions and context, the level of 
commitment to decentralization on the part of both central and local authorities, the 
capacities of central and local institutions, and the design of basin-level institutions. 
Finally, the paper will assess the performance of the decentralization process by 
examining three critical factors: devolution of authority, stakeholder participation and 
financial self-sustainability.  
2. Analytical Framework 
This case study follows the analytical framework developed for this research project and 
is applied to all eight case studies. The literature on institutional analysis of natural 
resource management and decentralization identifies a series of political and institutional 
factors associated with the emergence and sustainability of stakeholder-based, 
decentralized arrangements (Ostrom 1990, 1992; Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; Blomquist 
and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; and Wunsch 1991). The 
study seeks to evaluate how these factors operate in each of the empirical settings 
considered.  
  The framework explores a series of political and institutional variables.  
i) Contextual factors and initial conditions. The literature on decentralized water resource 
management suggests that successful decentralization is at least partly associated with the 
social context at the time a decentralization initiative is attempted, including:   
  Economic development of the nation; 
  Economic development of the basin area; 
  Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
  Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders. 
 
ii) Characteristics of the decentralization process. In countries that have attempted to 
decentralize water resource management to the basin level, characteristics of the 
decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for successful implementation.  
Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are (a) devolution of authority 
and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of that authority and responsibility 
by local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) occur will depend in part upon why and 
how the decentralization takes place.  Important factors include -  -  6
  Whether basin-level management was a local initiative, a devolution that was 
mutually desired by local stakeholders and central government officials, or a decision by 
central government officials to release themselves of responsibilities regardless of 
whether basin stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
  The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin governance; 
and, 
  Whether commitment to decentralization and basin management is maintained 
after transitions in central government administration. 
 
iii)  Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities. 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to affect that success.  Political and institutional variables should be explored 
that relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-level 
stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include 
  The extent to which devolution of water management responsibilities from central 
government to basin institutions has been real or merely rhetorical, and whether 
devolution has been handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as an 
abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
  The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the extent of their 
financial autonomy; 
  The ability of basin management participants to create and modify institutional 
arrangements according to their needs and circumstances; 
  The existence of other experience in the country with local self-governance and 
service provision; 
  The distribution of national-level political influence among basin stakeholders; 
  The extent to which the country’s  water rights system facilitates or hinders basin 
management efforts; and 
  Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for implementation and 
adaptation of basin management activities. 
 
iv)  The internal configuration of basin-level institutional  arrangements.  Successful 
implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend on features 
of the basin-level arrangements.  Important aspects include 
  The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
  The extent to which there is clarity about institutional boundaries, and whether 
these match with basin boundaries; 
  Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements recognize sub-
basin communities of interest; -  -  7
  The availability of fora for information-sharing and communication among basin 
stakeholders; 
  The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts through which 
basin stakeholders can contribute to improvements in basin conditions; 
  The institutionalization of basin monitoring systems that have credibility among 
water users; and 
  The availability of fora for conflict resolution. 
  The analytical framework presumes that in each case, some factors will have 
stronger impacts than others. The goal of the research is, therefore, not to describe in 
detail how each of these factors operate in every case, but to identify which ones are more 
powerful indicators of outcomes in each setting and how under different conditions, these 
factors combine in different ways. The study is also based on the assumption that, on the 
ground, participants and observers are likely to have different assessments of many of 
these variables, requiring the researcher to interview people with varying perspectives 
and positions. 
3. Methodology 
To explain and analyze the decentralization processes of water resources management in 
the Jaguaribe River Basin, research for this paper followed the approach defined for all 
case studies in the larger project.  This included the examination of primary documents 
on the basin and on the organizations involved and of a background paper prepared prior 
to field work
3. Then, interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the field.   
  Two field visits were carried out, during which team members met with and 
interviewed a range of individuals, including past and current federal and state 
government officials, current officials in water institutions, members of basin committees 
from all sectors (water users, municipalities, and organizations of civil society), and of 
user commissions. The interviews sought to understand how decentralization efforts have 
affected current institutional arrangements for water management at the sub-basin, basin 
and state levels and to evaluate the performance of these arrangements. The next step was 
to revise the background paper based on the interviews and information gathered during 
the field visits. Finally, this paper summarizes and analyzes the current situation of water 
management in the Jaguaribe River Basin.  
4. The Jaguaribe River Basin 
With an estimated 12% of the world’s surface water
4, Brazil is usually viewed as wealthy 
in terms of water resources. This abundance at the national level, however, masks 
situations of often dramatic, localized scarcity and conflicts among water uses. Water 
                                                 
3 The background paper for the Brazilian cases —Jaguaribe and Alto-Tietê River Basins — was prepared 
by Rosa Maria Formiga Johnsson and is available at www.worldbank.org/riverbasinmanagement  
4 Surface water availability is 182,600 m
3/s, which reaches 272,000 m
3/s if one considers the flow from 
neighboring countries into the Amazon river basin. The total volume of groundwater resources is 
estimated at 112 billion m
3 (ANA, 2002). -  -  8
resources are distributed unevenly throughout the country, concentrated in areas of low 
population density, while most regions are characterized by increasing pressure on the 
resource.  
  Most of Brazil’s freshwater resources (75%) are located in the Amazon river 
basin, which covers 48% of the country’s territory, but harbors only 4% of its population 
and is responsible for only a tiny proportion of the nation’s industrial development. The 
opposite extreme can be found in the Northeast region, which includes almost the entire 
semi-arid region of Brazil, the so-called “Drought Polygon” (Figure 1). Accounting for 
18% of Brazil’s territory and about 28% of its population, this region has only 5% of the 
country’s water resources. The current case study is particularly illustrative of the main 
problems faced by water management in these regions. 
  The Jaguaribe river basin is an independent basin in the Atlantic hydrographic 
region of Brazil’s Northeast, located entirely within the state of Ceará. It has a drainage 
area of 72,560 square kilometers, covering approximately 48% of the state’s territory. 
The principal river runs from south to north for about 610 km, flowing into the Atlantic 
Ocean (Cogerh/Engesoft, 1999d). The basin has 80 municipalities and more than 2 
million people, representing about a third of Ceará’s population. After an intense process 
of urbanization in recent decades, the majority of the basin’s population (over 55%) now 
lives in urban areas, still well below the state and national averages (of 72% and 81% 
respectively). Figure 1 shows the location of the Jaguaribe River Basin within Ceará, its 
hydrographic regions, major rivers and cities. 
  Most of the Jaguaribe basin falls within the semi-arid region known as the sertão 
(hinterland). Precipitation is highly variable, ranging from 400 mm in the hinterland to 
1,200 mm along the coast. Although such rates of rainfall are higher than in many dry 
regions in the world, in Ceará the combination of impermeable crystalline rocks in the 
soil and high temperatures produce elevated rates of evapotranspiration — over 2,000 
mm for the basin— and low levels of water retention and storage. Groundwater resources 
are considered of limited importance in most areas of the basin. Cyclical droughts occur 
at least every five years and can persist over several years (Cogerh/Engesoft, 1999a, 
1999b and 1999c).  
  Without regulation, all of the basin’s rivers would be intermittent, flowing only 
during the rainy season. The state’s —and previously the federal government’s— main 
policy strategy has therefore been to store water resources in reservoirs for the dry season 
and possible subsequent drought years. The result is that water resources infrastructure in 
the Jaguaribe Basin was already well developed before the decentralization process 
began. The basin has an estimated 4,713 reservoirs and a total storage capacity of 13,560 
million cubic meters. Seventy-five percent of this water availability is provided by three 
reservoirs
5 which have transformed about 470 kilometers of rivers in the middle and 
lower part of the basin (Jaguaribe and Banabuiú Valleys) into perennial waterways, 
directly benefiting 19 municipalities and changing the economic and political profile of 
the region. These reservoirs are also the main water sources for Ceara’s capital city, 
                                                 
5 The Orós reservoir (1.94 billion m
3), the Banabuiú reservoir (1.60 billion m
3) and the newly completed 
Castanhão reservoir (6.70 billion m
3). -  -  9
Fortaleza, and its metropolitan area, the state’s largest urban and industrial area, which, 
importantly, lies outside the basin. 
  For management purposes, the Jaguaribe basin has been divided into five 
hydrographic regions, corresponding to three parts of the basin (upper, middle and lower) 
and to two sub-basins: Upper Jaguaribe, Middle Jaguaribe, Lower Jaguaribe, Salgado and 













Figure 1: Jaguaribe River Basin in Ceará State, Brazil, its hydrographic regions and 
major cities  
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Table 1: Jaguaribe River Basin: principal characteristics, by sub-basin 
Sub-basin  Principal characteristics 
Upper Jaguaribe 
Largest hydrographic region with 
extensive ‘vazios hídricos’ (literally 
“waterless space”) 
Area: 24,538 km
2; 24 municipalities 
16 strategic
6 reservoirs, total capacity of 2.57 billion m
3 
Agriculture, cattle ranching,  
and the income of social security pensioners. 
Salgado 
 
Most important aquifer systems (Cariri 
region) 
Area: 13,275 km
2; 23 municipalities 






Largest storage capacity; largest 
reservoir in Ceará State (Castanhão)  
 
Area: 10,509 km
2; 13 municipalities 
1.210 reservoirs, 11 strategic ones with a total capacity of 
6.85 billion m
3 
Impoverished economy  
Banabuiú 
 
Most numerous water storage structures 
in the Jaguaribe Basin 
Area: 19,580 km
2; 12 municipalities 
1.594 reservoirs, 17 strategic ones with a tot. capacity of 2.7 
billion m
3 




Principal beneficiary of the regulation 
of the Jaguaribe Valley 
Area: 8,893 km
2; 9 municipalities 
207 reservoirs, 1 strategic one with a capacity of 27.7 
million m
3 
Expanding economy, especially in tourism, irrigation and 
shrimp farming. Largest irrigation potential in the basin.  
Source: Garjulli, Oliveira, Cunha et al, 2002; and Cogerh/Engesoft, 1999b. 
 
  In general, the basin is considered poor, even for Ceará, a state that contributes 
only 1.8% to the nation’s GNP.
7 Indeed, 63% of the state’s income is generated by 
Greater Fortaleza, mostly from the service sector (56%) followed by the industrial and 
agricultural/ranching sectors (38% and 6% respectively). The Jaguaribe basin follows the 
state trend, with most of its income deriving from the service sector. Although agriculture 
accounts for only a small part of the basin’s income, it is of great social importance since 
subsistence agriculture (dependent on rainfall) still employs most of the rural and poor 
basin population. 
5. Basin Management Issues and Stakeholders 
Water scarcity and recurrent droughts. For the last 100 years, the dominant 
management issues in the Jaguaribe Basin have been water scarcity and drought 
exposure. Until the beginning of the reform process in the early 1990s, this issue was 
treated as essentially a supply problem to be resolved through what is locally referred to 
as the solução hidráulica (“hydraulic solution”), i.e. through the massive construction of 
                                                 
6 “Strategic Reservoirs” are those that are big enough to withstand a sequence of multiple drought years. 
They are the backbone of Ceará’s water management system. Due to their size and costs, all strategic 
reservoirs of the state were built with public monies over the past century. 
7 The GNP of Brazil in 1999 was US$ 452.4 billion. US$ 1 = R$ 2.6 (April 2005). Data from IBGE (2000), 
and IPECE (2003).  -  -  11
reservoirs and related water infrastructure (Kemper, 1996). This approach, however, has 
exacerbated water use conflicts, providing no incentives against wasteful water use or in 
favor of water re-allocation. As will be discussed below, water reform has introduced 
new practices aimed at complementing this supply-side approach with demand 
management. Even so, the relationship between water availability and water demand 
remains still unbalanced in the Jaguaribe River Basin.  
  Several reasons have been noted for this situation (Cogerh, Engesoft, 1999e). 
First, water availability during drought periods remains uncertain, due to climatic and 
hydrological conditions. Water flows, and therefore effective storage, vary considerably 
from year to year. Dry years are not necessarily followed by other dry years, although this 
possibility must be planned for. Second, population growth and urbanization in the basin 
have resulted in more demand for water by domestic and industrial sectors. These sectors 
have increasingly competed with the dominant water use in the basin, irrigation projects 
promoted by the federal and state governments in the seventies. Third, vazios hídricos —
literally meaning “waterless spaces” or regions without water storage systems— continue 
to exist, especially in the upper basin.  
Growing urban demand and inter-basin transfers. A crucial change that has taken 
place since 1992, is that the Jaguaribe basin has become the main source of water for the 
expanding Greater Fortaleza region  (MRF – Região Metropolitana de Fortaleza).
8 This 
has generated protests from water users in the Jaguaribe basin, fearful that diversions to 
Fortaleza could come at the expense of their own water security.  
  Table 2 shows the total annual water demand for the principal consumptive uses 
within the Jaguaribe Basin (irrigation, households and industries), and the potential water 
demand for Greater Fortaleza. During recurrent drought periods, when the water supply 
system of the MRF is insufficient, the plan is for the Jaguaribe Basin to guarantee the 
supply of the entire urban and industrial potential demand of the MRF, increasing 
consumptive use of the basin’s waters to almost 43% of total demand.    
                                                 
8 In 1993, after a three-year drought and a threat of extreme water scarcity, the state government built an 
emergency canal (Canal do Trabalhador) that can divert up to 5 m
3/s —if necessary— from the Lower 
Jaguaribe sub-basin to the system of large dams which supplies Greater Fortaleza. Also, the new 
Castanhão reservoir, the largest in the state with a capacity of 6.7 billion m
3, was built mostly to meet 
increasing urban and industrial demand from Fortaleza. When the construction of the canal “Castanhão – 
Greater Fortaleza Integration Axis” is completed, it will have the capacity to divert up to 19 m
3/s —of the 
maximum of 22 m
3/s that can be released from the Castanhão reservoir— to Greater Fortaleza. The other 
strategic reason to build the Castanhão reservoir is the hope that the long-discussed diversion from the 
São Francisco River basin will come about. This diversion, which has been tabled in different shapes 
over the past 130 years, would provide water to water-thirsty northeastern state outside of the São 
Francisco basin. In order to receive such a water transfer, Ceará needed the corresponding infrastructure, 
which it now has.  -  -  12
Table 2.  Estimated current water consumption for the main uses within the 
Jaguaribe Basin and potential water demand for the Metropolitan Region of 
Fortaleza  
Water use  Annual demand 
(million m3)    (%) 
Total 
(%) 
Public Irrigation (Jaguaribe Basin)  202.77  27.3 
Private Irrigation (Jaguaribe Basin)  146.66  19.8 
Domestic (Jaguaribe Basin)    51.95    7.0 
Industrial (Jaguaribe Basin)    22.80    3.1 
 
57.2 
Domestic (MRF)*  184.00  24.8 
Industrial (MRF)*  134.00  18.0 
42.8 
Total   742.18    100 
Source: Cogerh, Engesoft, 1999d. 
*Demand estimates to be supplied by the Integration Axis, a canal under construction 
which will divert water from the Castanhão reservoir (Middle Jaguaribe Sub-basin) to 
Greater Fortaleza. 
 
Intra-basin water scarcity and allocation.  In addition to the above, the traditional 
major management issue in the basin is conflict over intra-basin water allocation. This is 
mostly a result both of the strong variation of climatic conditions and historic 
management practices. The most frequent conflicts arise between the users that depend 
directly on reservoir waters and those located downstream, and among users in the 
valleys that have been rendered perennial through regulation, henceforth referred to as 
“regulated valleys”
9 (Garjulli, Oliveira, Cunha et al, 2002). In the Jaguaribe Basin, an 
innovative management practice referred to as “negotiated water allocation” among users, 
has demonstrated tremendous potential for mediating and even resolving some of these 
conflicts. This effort will be discussed in Section 7.  
Water quality and environmental concerns. Water quality is another major concern in 
the Jaguaribe basin, although little is known about how severe the problem is. One of the 
main sources of declining water quality is the lack of municipal wastewater collection 
and treatment. Very few municipalities have sewage collection or treatment systems, and 
those that exist serve only a small portion of the basin’s population. In fact, the majority 
of urban areas have expanded without adequate sanitation infrastructure. River banks 
have been massively occupied, and untreated sewage is commonly released directly into 
rivers and other bodies of water. In addition, although no reliable data exists concerning 
industrial and non-point source pollution, agricultural practices in the region have 
generally given little consideration to land degradation and other externalities, such as the 
impacts of excessive agrochemical use. In turn, river monitoring by the state environment 
agency (SEMACE - Superintendência Estadual do Meio Ambiente) has not been 
systematic and only the three major reservoirs have any kind of water quality control 
program. Available data in the Jaguaribe Basin Plan (Cogerh, Engesoft, 1999f), suggest 
that there is substantial variation in the water quality of the main river, with critical points 
                                                 
9 From the Portuguese “vales perenizados”. -  -  13
and periods of high organic pollution. The plan also identifies a high concentration of 
fecal coliforms in the major reservoirs and their upstream areas at the beginning of the 
rainy season (January/February).  
  All in all, the environmental aspects of river basin management have not yet been 
incorporated into the state’s policy agenda in the same way that has occurred with water 
allocation and use. However, field interviews suggested that local actors involved in river 
basin committees and water user associations have substantial concern with these issues. 
This is a clear change compared to a decade ago when environmental issues in general 
were entirely superseded by water quantity and allocation concerns.  
Recurrent floods. The inter-annual irregularity of precipitation in Ceará raises another 
management issue: flooding problems. While some years are very dry, rainfall is extreme 
in other years. When rainfall is high in the Jaguaribe Basin, as occurred in 2004, floods 
affect various cities, especially those located near the Jaguaribe river in the lower part of 
the basin. This problem has yet to be dealt with effectively, although some reservoirs, 
such as the new Castanhão dam, the largest in South America for ephemeral rivers, were 
planned to diminish flooding in the cities.  
Inadequate operation and maintenance of water infrastructure. Finally, we should 
note two other significant issues that reflect the past mismanagement of the water 
resources, namely inadequate operation and maintenance practices that led to a 
deterioration in physical infrastructure, and the lack of knowledge about the real 
availability and utilization of groundwater in the basin (Cogerh, Engesoft, 1999b).  
  The list of issues above makes it clear that the Jaguaribe basin has been subject to 
the typical water management challenges encountered in semi-arid regions experiencing 
population and economic growth. Over a 100-year period, these (increasing) challenges 
had been addressed within a top-down patriarchal structure, which however did not seem 
to lead to solutions. In spite of the great investments in water infrastructure, drought and 
floods continued to affect farmers, and new concerns had to be addressed with the state 
capital area growing at a rapid pace, from 507,710 in 1960 to 2.1 million in 2000.   
  The situation was similar in the other basins of the state in 1986. With a new 
government coming in that focused on modern industrialized and urban development —
which implied the need for reliable water supply— a new management approach had to 
be found. The new water management institutions to be discussed below are in the 
process of confronting most of these problems.  
6. Institutional Arrangements for Basin Management 
Before the current reform began in the early 1990s, water resource policy and 
management in the Jaguaribe Basin, in Ceará state, and in the semi-arid region more 
generally, was traditionally the domain of federal initiative. The main federal agency for 
drought prevention —the National Department of Drought Relief (DNOCS – 
Departamento Nacional de Obras contra as Secas)— was created in the 1910s. Since 
then, it has expended large amounts of federal money for massive construction of water 
storage infrastructure. In the last century, close to 7,000 reservoirs were built in Ceará, 
about 130 of which are considered” strategic” and serve multiple water uses (Garjulli, -  -  14
2001). While the largest and most strategic reservoirs were built by DNOCS, the state 
government focused on building small ones, usually during drought crises. This supply-
based approach was characterized by a centralized, rigid and un-transparent decision-
making structure that favored the interests of large landowners and the irrigation projects 
financed by DNOCS.  
  The first steps toward institutional change in Ceará were the creation of the 
Secretariat of Water Resources and the approval of the state Water Law (11.996/1992). 
The law embraces the main ideas of modern water resource management, following the 
principles of the – only subsequently developed - federal water law (Law 9.433/1997) 
and those of other state laws: integrated water management, with the river basin as the 
planning unit; water as a finite and fragile resource and as an economic good; and 
decentralized and participatory management. Likewise, Ceará included the same 
management instruments later instituted by the federal law: state and basin water 
resources plans; bulk water use permits; bulk water charges; and a water resources 
information system. However, the political and institutional organization proposed in the 
state water law is more centralized than in many Brazilian states and in the federal law. 
For instance, the basin committees have fewer deliberative powers for some issues, 
especially the definition of the bulk water pricing system which elsewhere is one of their 
primary competencies. Another significant difference is that, in Ceará, basin committees 
will not have their own executive support structures (water agencies); the state law 
defined that technical support should be provided by state management institutions.  
  The creation of Ceará’s Water Resources Management Company (COGERH – 
Companhia de Gestão dos Recursos Hídricos) in 1993, almost two years after the 
passage of that state’s water law, made the differences between the Ceará model and 
other state systems even more striking, and also more centralized. While most states 
relied on existing environmental or water agencies funded through the general state 
budget, in Ceará a strong, independent and eventually self-financed Water Resources 
Management Company (COGERH – Companhia de Gestão dos Recursos Hídricos) was 
created in 1993 to carry out management, monitoring and enforcement functions. In 
addition to affirming a new approach to the management of state resources, the creation 
of COGERH also represented the beginning of a process of taking over control of federal 
infrastructure in the state, until then mostly governed by DNOCS. Developing the new 
policies and convincing the water using public to accept these principles was greatly 
aided through the recruitment and maintenance of staff which were strong from a 
technical sense and that were extremely dedicated to the new concepts of water resources 
management. COGERH has recently created seven regional offices (Gerências 
Interioranas), four of which are in the Jaguaribe Basin. 
  Since COGERH was created, the predominant logic has been to centralize the 
technical aspects of water management as well as the collection of water charges in that 
agency, with the objective of financing both its administrative expenses and the operation 
and maintenance of the water infrastructure for which it is responsible. One of the reasons 
for the decision to centralize water charging, rather than to operate on a basin-by-basin 
basis as the federal framework proposes, is the need for the redistribution of financial 
resources among basins in the state, since – except for the Greater Fortaleza Basin - none 
could be expected to cover their own operating and maintenance expenses.  -  -  15
The creation of basin institutions has occurred gradually over more than ten years, under 
the initiative and coordination of COGERH and with the support of the State Water 
Resources Secretariat (SRH – Secretaria dos Recursos Hídricos). The result has been the 
emergence of various types of local organizations, with different features, responsibilities 
and territorial scales of management, which partially overlap:  
  the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú User Commission, which basically  defines the annual 
operating rules of the three majors reservoirs of the basin, according to the negotiated 
water allocation between the users of the regulated valleys; 
  36 user commissions of “isolated strategic reservoirs”, i.e. those that guarantee 
multiple water use in locally important reservoirs during drought periods;  
  5 sub-basin committees, corresponding to three parts of the basin (Upper, Middle 
and Lower Jaguaribe) and to two basins of Jaguaribe’s tributaries (Salgado and Banabuiú 
Sub-basins). Together, they cover the entire territory of the Jaguaribe basin. 
  Figure 2 shows these local institutions within the Jaguaribe River Basin. 
  Soon after the process of local mobilization began, it became clear that focusing 
solely on the hydrographic region (basin, sub-basin or part of a basin) — as called for in 
the water law—was not the best approach in the semi-arid Northeast. Adaptation to local 
conditions was necessary. Local stakeholder interactions were most intense around 
reservoirs and along the regulated river valleys (Oliveira, Garjulli and Silva, 2001).  
  In the search for solutions to the conflicts that arose during the major 1992-1994 
drought, COGERH officials and local stakeholders decided to create a commission of 
water users to conceive and manage an emergency operation plan for the strategic 
reservoirs. Based on the way local organizations were already organized, thirty-six 
commissions of reservoir users and one commission of users in the regulated valleys of 
the Jaguaribe and Banabuiú Rivers were eventually created out of this pioneering 
experiment, which was a major departure from previous policies under the federal 
DNOCS. While their attribution and composition are similar (water users, civil society, 
and representatives of the key institutions debate and deliberate, together, on the release 
of water stored in the reservoirs with strategic purposes for integrated water 
management), there is a significant difference in the territorial scale within which they 
operate (Figure 2). The Jaguaribe and Banabuiú Valleys Commission covers the valleys 
of the Jaguaribe and Banabuiú Rivers, regulated by the three major reservoirs of the basin 
(Orós, Banabuiú and Castanhão). The jurisdiction of a reservoir commission, however, 
corresponds to a much smaller territorial unit; its main purpose is to guarantee multiple 
water use in the immediate surroundings of the reservoir during drought periods when 
rivers dry up.   
  The five sub-basin committees that exist today in the Jaguaribe Basin were 
created only several years after stakeholder participation was established through the 
commissions (Garjulli, Oliveira, Cunha et ali, 2002). The committees have broader water 
management competency than the commission, such as setting guidelines, approving 
river basin plans and conflict resolution. Their creation, which occurred between 1998 
and 2001, was a much more formalized process which had to comply with both national 
and state regulations.  -  -  16
 
 
Figure 2.  Decentralized institutions of the Jaguaribe River Basin: sub-basin 
committees, Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission and some of the existing 
reservoir commissions  
Source: developed based on COGERH and field data.  
 
  Besides these key institutions for water management in the Jaguaribe Basin, many 
federal, state and municipal institutions have influence over water issues, as indicated in 
Table 3.  
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Institution  Current water management responsibilities 
Financial aspects 
ANA  
(Agência Nacional das Águas) 
- National Water Agency 
Establishment of the National Water Resources Policy and System. Priority for fighting pollution 
and drought. 










control of federal 
waters  
DNOCS  
(National Department of 
Drought Relief) 
Protection against drought and flooding, promotion of irrigation in semi-arid regions. In Ceará 
state: management, operation and maintenance of reservoirs and infrastructure built with federal 
money, nowadays primarily run by COGERH, established through a written agreement. 
Funded through the federal budget  
SRH (Secretaria dos 
Recursos Hídricos) - 
Water Resources Secretariat 
Establishment of State Water Resources Policy. Coordination of the state water management 
system. Responsible for issuing and controlling water permits, with the technical support of 
COGERH 




Responsible for the planning and management of state waters, O&M of the hydraulic system, 
water allocation, introduction and implementation of bulk water charge system, and organization 
of and interaction with user commissions and basin committees. In addition to its headquarters, 
COGERH has 7 regional offices in Ceará State. 
Funded through bulk water charges 
FUNCEME  
(Fundação Cearense de 
Meteorologia e Recursos 
Hídricos) - Foundation for 
Meteorology and Water 
Resources 
Responsible for meteorological monitoring in Ceará. Provides technical support to COGERH for 
simulations of reservoir operations and water allocation. 
 












control of state 
waters 
SOHIDRA 
(Superintendência de Obras 
Hidráulicas)- Water 
Infrastructure Superintendency
Responsible for building and maintaining the state’s water resources infrastructure 
 
Funded through the State Budget and International Loans -  -  18
CAGECE  
(Companhia de Águas e 
Esgoto do Ceará) 
(State water and sanitation 
company) 
Provides urban water supply to Greater Fortaleza and most municipalities in the interior of Ceará. 
Provides sanitation services only to Greater Fortaleza and a very few municipalities in the interior.  
Funded through water fees and the state budget. Limited recovery of O&M costs.  
Sub-basin committees  
Formal institutions under state 
jurisdiction and regulation 
Corresponds to the Upper, Middle and Lower Jaguaribe, and to the Salgado and Banabuiú Sub-
basins  
No systematic funding. Occasional financial support from COGERH. 
Jaguaribe and Banabuiú 
Valleys User Commission  
 
Informal institution created by 
the state (COGERH) 
Covering the regulated parts of the Jaguaribe and Banabuiú Valleys (see Figure 2), it includes 
water users, civil society, and representatives of key institutions. 
The commission basically decides the annual operation rules for the three majors reservoirs of the 
basin (Orós, Banabuiú and Castanhão), through negotiations among its members about water 
allocation, and under the leadership and guidance of COGERH.  






Informal institutions created 
by the state (COGERH) 
The 36 reservoir commissions include users and other stakeholders interested in or affected by 
water allocations in the area of hydrological influence of each “isolated strategic reservoir”.  
The allocation process they engage in is similar to what occurs in the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys 
Commission.  
No systematic funding. 
Municipal Secretariats 
related to urban water 
infrastructure and management 
issues 
Responsible for managing land use and occupation. Shares responsibility with state government for 
urban drainage and local environmental issues.  





powers over land 
use, urban 
drainage, and water 
supply and 
sanitation  
Municipal Water and 
Sanitation Services  
Only a few municipalities are not supplied by CAGECE and have their own local urban water 
supply services.  
Funded by water fees and municipal budgets. Limited recovery of O&M costs. No financial or 
technical assistance from the state. Partially supported by the Federal Health Agency (FNS - 
Fundação Nacional de Saúde).  -  -  19
Over time, considerable changes have thus been made in the institutional arrangements 
originally defined by the state water law. In observing its evolution, one can say that the 
spirit of the law has been taken seriously and that the institutional landscape of water 
management in Ceará has been revolutionized over the past one and a half decades. This 
is the case both in terms of the new actors – the water user commissions and committees, 
COGERH, the State Water Resources Secretariat, and also in terms of how these actors 
relate to each other and to the long-established previous actors such as DNOCS, 
CAGECE, the municipalities, and the individual and industrial water users.  
  Indeed, Ceará is the state that has progressed the furthest in terms of 
implementing water reform, overtaking even São Paulo, whose reforms originally 
preceded and inspired those of Ceará.  It was the first state —and the only one until 
2003— to implement a system of bulk water charges, which are currently levied on 
domestic, industrial and some irrigation water uses. This has given COGERH financial 
self-sustainability. Water management and allocation decision-making for strategic 
reservoirs has become more democratic and participatory, becoming a sort of informal 
water rights system. The state and most of the river basins now have water resources 
plans which reflect more comprehensive and higher-quality knowledge about water 
problems. 
7.  Participants’ Motivations, Incentives, and Actions 
The institutional changes that took place in Ceará and in the Jaguaribe Basin at the 
beginning of the 1990s have significantly changed power positions. Stakeholders that in 
the past had little influence over water management now actively participate in water 
resources management and groups that before were entirely excluded from decision-
making have also come onto the political scene. Here we will briefly discuss the way that 
four organizations or groups —COGERH, DNOCS, SRH, CAGECE and water users— 
have acted and interacted in the new institutional context and then discuss a series of 
issues that continue to generate conflict among a broader group of institutions.   
 COGERH, the state water management agency, has certainly become the most 
pivotal water management institution in the state, involved in all aspects of water policy. 
The new agency not only took on responsibilities previously under other jurisdictions, but 
also filled a vacuum in water management by creating new organizations and policy 
mechanisms. Only by making such ambitious changes was it possible for COGERH to 
effectively assume its mission as the state agency for integrated water resources 
management. One of the first struggles for COGERH to establish itself as an entity to be 
taken seriously was to take formal control over infrastructure from DNOCS, the agency 
historically in control of federal reservoirs, and from CAGECE, the state water and 
sanitation company (Kemper and Olson, 2000). 
  After dominating for decades management and water allocation of the most 
strategic reservoirs in Ceará, DNOCS did not easily give up this responsibility. It had 
already been losing influence since the 1970s with its financial and human resources in 
decline. As a federal agency, responsible for all of the nine states of the Brazilian semi-
arid Northeast – the “Drought Polygon”, DNOCS has always had its headquarters in 
Fortaleza and the larger part of its infrastructure domain has been in Ceará. For this -  -  20
reason, Ceará was an important state in which DNOCS wanted to retain its power over 
infrastructure and management decisions. Despite initial and strong resistance, however, 
DNOCS eventually accepted the transfer of power to COGERH
10. This change was 
driven by the then new and entrepreneurial government of the State, which wielded 
considerable influence also at the national government level to be able to bring about this 
change. It was also supported strongly by the World Bank which at the time was 
negotiating a loan with the government of Ceará and made it a condition that further 
World Bank support to hydraulic infrastructure could only be provided if institutional 
reforms would be put in place to ensure long-term sustainability.  
  The resilience of the change was demonstrated by the renewal in 2004 of the 
agreement between DNOCS and Ceará’s government through which the former shared 
powers with COGERH over the management, operation and maintenance of federal 
reservoirs. At the same time, under a new federal administration since 2002, DNOCS is 
going through a phase of restructuring. If on the one hand, the agency may be taking on a 
stronger role in water management in states other than Ceará than in the past (Lemos and 
Oliveira, 2004), on the other hand, this role is now clearly understood to involve 
partnership with state governments. In this respect, DNOCS has recently signed a new 
contract with ANA (National Water Agency) to support participatory management in 
federal reservoirs in collaboration with state governments, not only in Ceará but 
throughout the Northeast.  
  The struggle for control over infrastructure has also taken place between 
COGERH and CAGECE, the State Water and Sanitation Company. COGERH was 
supposed to be the bulk water management agency of the state and it was supposed to be 
self-financed through pricing for its services. Only one basin in the state, the 
Metropolitan Basin where Fortaleza lies, has an economy that is dynamic enough to 
generate substantial income through water charges. Since Greater Fortaleza’s industries 
were already paying CAGECE for bulk water before the creation of COGERH, that 
agency was resistant to giving up this source of revenues. After extensive negotiations, 
both parties reached a complex agreement which, essentially, has allowed COGERH to 
take over the Metropolitan basin system. Both industries and CAGECE itself are charged 
for bulk water, but the former pay 60 times more than the latter (for details, see Kemper 
and Olson, 2000). Apart from this initial squabble, CAGECE can be said to have mainly 
benefited from the advent of COGERH and the new water resources management system 
in the state. Being responsible for supplying Greater Fortaleza with water, it has an 
interest in well-managed water resources and in transparency regarding the availability of 
water on a seasonal basis. At the same time, CAGECE is a strong stakeholder in the 
system and not a very efficient water company. As in many other placeS worldwide, it is 
also in Ceará politically difficult to charge adequate tariffs for domestic water supply and 
sanitation services, and the state government, which determines tariffs, has not raised 
them to a level that would permit CAGECE to stand on its own financial feet. That is also 
the reason why CAGECE pays far less to COGERH for the bulk water it receives than 
the industries do although ultimately it is the principal beneficiary of the bulk water 
                                                 
10 The transfer of power was only with regard to water resources infrastructure, not however, public 
irrigation perimeters, which remain under or affiliated to DNOCS to this day, even in those irrigation 
perimeters that were partially transferred to farmers. -  -  21
interbasin transfer out of the Jaguaribe basin. In the case of other water users, we must 
distinguish the “privileged users” from the rest. Even in the absence of a formal water 
rights concession system, some user groups have traditionally had priority in gaining 
access to water, especially irrigation projects run by DNOCS, large users and 
agribusiness, and, of course, human consumption, which is guaranteed first priority by 
law. Generally, these privileged users are also the most organized groups in the basin, 
with greater economic and political resources. Such groups cannot be expected to see 
benefits in changing the water resources management system. Those who have not been 
privileged historically —such as fishermen, vazanteiros
11, and smaller irrigators— would 
however theoretically benefit most from formal water rights, decentralization and 
participatory management (Kemper, 1996). And, in practice, such groups have indeed 
benefited most over the last decade from the “negotiated allocation” processes, through 
which groups representing larger numbers of less powerful users have finally gained a 
voice. This is not to say that large and medium-sized users have been excluded from the 
process. Indeed, they still tend to dominate the water allocation negotiations. However, 
less privileged users and civil society groups have also gained access to a process in 
which, previously, they had no say at all.
12 
  The user commissions are more inclusive than the basin committees and the water 
allocation process is notable for its transparency, since users and other local stakeholders 
decide the volumes to be released from the reservoirs as well as the use and conservation 
rules that must be respected by all users. Furthermore, while no user can be certain of the 
exact amount of water to which they will have access year after year —actual water 
availability is only known at the end of each rainy season—, the system has increased the 
reliability of supply for all water user groups, albeit sometimes in smaller amounts than 
many would prefer. The result has been that over the last few years substantial reductions 
in water use have occurred in the Jaguaribe Basin (COGERH, 2000, 2001 and 2002). 
This has prevented more serious water shortages – common in the past. However, the 
user commissions are still only informal institutions. 
  Understanding the relationships among actors involved in water management in 
the basin requires not only looking at how federal-to-state and state-river basin 
decentralization has affected the relationship among them, but also how the institution of 
new water management instruments affects the interests of varying groups.  
  The negotiated allocation of water through the user commissions co-exists 
uncomfortably with an emerging formal water permit system. Water use permits, which 
the state SRH has slowly begun to issue with the help of COGERH (Cogerh, Engesoft, 
1999g; Baltar, Azevedo, Rêgo and Porto, 2003), are not required to respect the decisions 
of the user commissions. A proposal is on the table to grant permits for longer periods, 
coupling them with the negotiated allocation process as it is practiced, for example, in the 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, USA (Kemper, 1999). This would give 
                                                 
11 When the water level in a reservoir recedes, due to outflows or evaporation, the rim of humid soil that is 
uncovered is called a vazante. Farmers, mostly small subsistence farmers, who cultivate in these areas are 
called vazanteiros. Vazanteiros can also be found along rivers. 
12 These conclusions are based on interviews in February 2004, confirmed by Ballestero (2004) cited by 
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users the security of holding permits for a specific period while specific amounts would 
be negotiated each year, based on water availability. Currently, however, water permits 
have for the most part not been monitored or enforced, meaning that permit holders have 
few advantages over unauthorized users. Furthermore, some users are suspicious of 
formal permits, fearing that obtaining them will make them more susceptible to being 
charged for water in the future.  
  The introduction of water charges is also raising tension in the Jaguaribe basin. 
While the negotiated allocation of water was largely met with approval, COGERH is 
facing opposition from the users and local stakeholders to implementing this management 
instrument. Currently, only water and sanitation companies, which use only 12% of the 
water from the Jaguaribe Basin, pay into the system, according to the same rules that 
apply elsewhere in the state: charges are only for water that is measurably used, in 
another departure from the national model.
13 Given that water in the Jaguaribe Basin is 
mostly used for low-value agriculture, irrigators are largely unwilling and unable to pay 
at levels that would compensate for what COGERH spends on operating and maintaining 
water infrastructure in the basin.  
  In recognition how difficult it would be to convince Ceara’s farmers to pay for 
bulk water under these conditions
14, COGERH has followed another strategy: to start by 
charging the major users in the Metropolitan basin. This basin has both the majority of 
industrial users, the sector for whom water charges would have the smallest relative 
impact on cost structures and the water supply system with the greatest potential to be 
financially self-sustainable. At the state level, charges were introduced gradually, starting 
with municipal users in 1996, industrial users in 1998 and only in 2000 expanding to a 
very small number of irrigators. Today, the Metropolitan Basin still contributes over 90% 
of the total collected revenues. COGERH currently charges industries 15 times as much 
as it charges the water supply system in Greater Fortaleza and 30 times more than the 
water companies elsewhere, including in the Jaguaribe Basin. When pricing was first 
introduced, the difference between the charges for industries and water companies was 
even greater. Industries did not resist paying COGERH, however, because the prices were 
still only half of what CAGECE had been charging previously. COGERH has plans to 
expand state water charges, starting in 2004, to gradually include irrigation, shrimp 
farming, fishing and other uses. However, this effort has proven difficult, as was 
observed by the authors during field work. On the one hand, water users and civil society 
organizations have increasingly raised criticisms that COGERH has been non-transparent 
with respect to how it defines prices and determines how proceeds will be used. It should 
be noted, however, that local stakeholders apparently do not question the centralization of 
pricing at the state level, an acceptance that is explained by the fact that most users are 
served by public water supply infrastructure and that most of Ceará's basins are 
                                                 
13 The dominant vision of water charges in the country is that pricing is based on use permits rather than on 
measured use. In turn, three types of water use permits would be granted, as stated by the new Brazilian 
legislation: for withdrawal, for consumption, and for effluent dilution (i.e., the volume of water needed to 
reach the concentration of pollutants set by standards in the water body where effluents are released). 
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underdeveloped and therefore benefit from the transfer of revenues from charges from the 
Metropolitan Basin.
15   
  On the other hand, irrigators continue to resist the introduction of water charges. 
An attempt was made in 2001-2002 to introduce charges for this sector in the Jaguaribe 
basin, combining it with other management instruments. The Águas do Vale (Valley 
Waters) program was conceived and implemented by Ceará State and the National Water 
Agency (ANA) and has often been referred to as “a form of water trading” (COGERH, 
n.d.). However, the results were not encouraging. In 2001, with reservoirs at a perilously 
low level, it became clear that the water stored in the Jaguaribe reservoirs would be 
insufficient to supply all irrigators in the Jaguaribe and Banabuiú valleys, despite the fact 
that negotiated water allocation had led to reduced consumption. Since 59% of all water 
demand in the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú valleys came from rice producers using flooding as an 
irrigation method, the program’s key feature was a mechanism to compensate them for 
their lost production if they agreed to shift to less thirsty and more profitable crops such 
as cantaloupe and banana. The general objective of the program was reached in terms of 
reducing consumption, since reductions were sufficient to allow all demands to be 
satisfied in the basin that year. Financial compensation was clearly effective in providing 
incentives for users to reduce consumption and to re-allocate water to more efficient 
activities, with lower water consumption and higher production values, according to the 
internationally well-known motto ‘more crop per drop’. But the efforts to charge those 
that did not change their practices were less successful. The program collected only about 
20% of the amount charged and less than 10% of the total amount expected (Osny, 2003). 
Considering the high level of non-payment (80%) —which means that many irrigators 
received enough water for normal production without paying— it is not surprising that 
some local actors considered the experiment a failure and that the program lost 
credibility. When questioned about how to explain these results, SRH and COGERH 
employees emphasized the rushed process of designing the program, problems in 
implementation, the resulting lack of an information system, and the lack of political will 
to charge big irrigators
16. Apparently, though few paid the charges, all rice irrigators who 
joined the program received compensation for non-production. In the following year, the 
program was discontinued and these farmers went back to rice production.  
  Finally, it should be noted that the institution of the bulk water pricing system is 
met with substantial resistance from users and civil society at large because they fear the 
creation of a water market in the Jaguaribe basin. Even COGERH and SRH officials are 
generally unconvinced about the idea of water trading, even though a pilot water market 
project has been approved through a contract between Ceará state and the World Bank. 
  In summary, the motivation of the different key stakeholders converges in the 
sense that all see a benefit it river basin management. Water users, especially the more 
underprivileged ones, appreciate that they have a seat at the table – something which they 
                                                 
15 In most of Brazil, basin committees not only negotiate the values of the charges directly with users but 
also decide how proceeds should be used, according to the priorities set by basin plans. This is what is 
proposed by the federal and most of the states’ water legislations, and applied since 2003 in the Paraíba 
do Sul River Basin, in the southeast of the region. More details can be found in Formiga-Johnsson and 
Lopes (eds), 2003. 
16 Interviews with SRH and COGERH’s officials in February, 2004. -  -  24
never used to have before. At the same time, institutional change in the Jaguaribe basin 
has developed so far that the management instruments, such as bulk water charges, water 
permits and allocation mechanisms are on the table. There seems to be a divergence in 
terms of the definition and implementation of these instruments. Water users want to 
have more of a say in these – guarding their interests to reliably receive water at the 
lowest possible cost to them – while the state seems to assume that the involvement of 
users at the current level, i.e. mainly discussions, information and negotiated allocation, is 
sufficient devolution of power to the river basin level
17. This issue is further explored 
below. 
8. Applying the Analytical Framework  
Examining the factors identified in the analytical framework of Section 2 will contribute 
to our ability to understand the impact of decentralization on the Jaguaribe River Basin 
and on Integrated Water Resource Management.  
8.1. Initial Conditions and Contextual Factors 
At the time that reform began, local conditions in the Jaguaribe basin seemed unfavorable 
to the development of a decentralized and integrated water resources management in 
several respects.  
  First, the basin is characterized by poverty, even in the Brazilian context. The 
political and economic development that occurred in the middle and lower parts of the 
basin (Jaguaribe and Banabuiú Valleys) during the 1970s —a result of construction of 
very large reservoirs— was not enough to change this general picture. Today, Ceará 
accounts for only 1.8% of all of Brazil’s wealth, mostly concentrated in the Metropolitan 
Basin, where the state capital  Fortaleza is located (IBGE, 2004; IPECE, 2003).  
  Second, the proposal of participatory water management diverges in fundamental 
ways from the political culture of the Ceará hinterlands (sertão), since until the reforms 
began, water there had historically been considered either a private good, the property of 
the owners of the lands through which it flowed or under the control of the government 
agencies of the reservoirs within which it lay (usually DNOCS). Ceará had one of the 
most entrenched oligarchies in the Northeast, characterized by clientelist practices and 
the power of political bosses. The large landowners who dominated state politics 
benefited from continuing low industrialization, significant agricultural subsidies, cheap 
water and large infrastructure projects including the construction of reservoirs on their 
own lands (Furtado, 1959 and 1987; Kemper and Olson, 2000). Third, the way water 
resources were distributed among basin stakeholders prior to reforms strongly favored 
irrigation projects promoted by the federal and state governments in the seventies. 
Irrigators in the basin account for about 83% —or 342 million m
3 per year— of total 
water consumption in the basin, with 37% for private activities and 46% for government 
projects. Most of the conflicts in the basin involve this sector. Thus, one would have 
expected that reforms would not succeed.  
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  At the same time, however, other factors favored reform, especially in the broader 
context within which the changes would take place. At the national level, the transition to 
democracy, that followed the fall of Brazil’s military regime in the mid-1980s, was 
accompanied by broadened acceptance throughout Brazilian society of values such as 
democratization, decentralization, and participation in policy making. At the same time, 
at the national level an unprecedented movement within the technical water resource 
community began to promote integrated water resources management. This movement, 
led in large part by the Brazilian Water Resources Association, had a strong impact on 
the dissemination throughout the country of certain management models, such as water 
use rights, pricing, and river basin level management (Formiga-Johnsson, 1998). At the 
same time, at the state level, in the context of a new generation of state government 
leadership who had a more modern vision of development compared to the landed elite 
that had dominated the state’s policies for so long, and who initiated a more generalized 
reform of Ceará’s administrative structure in the same time period, the creation of 
innovative institutional arrangements for water resource management at state and basin 
levels was favored. This process was also supported by the World Bank in the context of 
the implementation of the state water law of 1992. 
  In Ceará, specifically, the key enabling factor was the existence of strong political 
will in the form of advocates for the adoption of a new form of management of water 
resources. A succession of Governors and leading government officials over a time 
period of over 12 years furnished the stable political support required for the adoption of 
such radical changes in water policy. This coupled with the recruitment and maintenance 
of staff who were strong from a technical point of view and extremely dedicated to the 
new concepts of water resources management aided greatly in the process of developing 
the new policies and convincing the water user public to accept these principles. Thus, 
the change in the state political environment in the mid-Eighties helped overcome the 
other rather unfavorable factors and was crucial to break the path dependence of water 
resources management in the state. 
  With the results in hand, one can say that the reformist context, both within the 
state and the country, worked together to overcome very strong vested interests that 
would otherwise have been expected to stall any serious attempt towards decentralization. 
8.2. Characteristics of the Decentralization Process 
Contrary to water management practices in the humid South and Southeast of Brazil, the 
semi-arid region has had a long history of federal intervention. Thus, the decentralization 
process in the Jaguaribe basin was marked by two distinct processes: i) decentralization 
from federal to state level, a result of the increased technical, institutional and financial 
capacity of Ceará’s water resource management agencies; and ii) decentralization from 
state to local level, which occurred through the creation of deliberative and consultative  
bodies at the river basin and lower territorial levels.  
  The creation of COGERH was not part of the original design called for in the state 
water law (Law 11.996/1992), but resulted from the World Bank’s insistence that the 
state create a water agency with management, monitoring and enforcement functions, 
including pricing and the involvement and organization of local stakeholders (Kemper -  -  26
and Olson, 2000).  The fact that in 1997 COGERH took over some of DNOCS’s 
management responsibilities represented a major step towards decentralization from 
federal to state level. The sustainability of this federal to state decentralization process 
has been demonstrated over time. As, several times, elections have brought changes in 
the party control of both state and federal governments, state control over federal 
infrastructure has continued, as demonstrated by the renewal of the contract between 
DNOCS and COGERH in 2004, discussed above. Indeed, there are signs that federal-to-
state devolution is increasing, such as a recent agreement between COGERH and the 
National Water Agency delegating authority for issuing use permits for waters in federal 
reservoirs
18. Even DNOCS never acquired such authority.
19  
  The state-to-local decentralization process has been more complex. It can clearly 
be characterized as a top-down initiative, in which COGERH’s User Mobilization 
Department (DOU) played a central role. The Department employed a group of 
sociologists who, in the effort to implement participatory management practices, were 
able to manage a delicate balance between the sometimes centralizing tendencies and 
interests of a state-level institution, and local interests and customs (Formiga-Johnsson 
and Scatasta, forthcoming). The fact that the state government took the initiative in 
decentralization was clearly the result of their efforts, considering that as a whole and in 
spite of a clear shift in development outlook, the state government was still under the 
influence of powerful elites who questioned both allowing new actors into the decision-
making process and decreasing the role of the central state government.  
  Recent changes, in fact, demonstrated that the commitment of the current state 
government to the devolution of decision-making to local bodies is fragile (Lemos and 
Oliveira, 2004). In 2003, the DOU was dismantled, revealing that the priorities of the 
current leadership in the state government are different. Upper echelons at COGERH and 
the State Water Resources Secretariat are increasingly distrustful of the participatory 
decision-making bodies that were created.  Although the long-term impact of these 
changes on the user commissions and river basin committees is still unclear, reform-
oriented officials hope that the high level of mobilization achieved in the basin over the 
last ten years will make it difficult to undo the advances made thus far
20. 
 
                                                 
18 The fact that only one of Ceará’s rivers is federal could lead one to believe that the relationship between 
Federal and State government is less relevant in Ceará. This interpretation would be, however, incorrect, 
since the constitutional norm of 1988 (art. 26) grants federal control over waters collected by federal 
projects, even when these are built on state rivers.  
19 This is one of the first of what ANA plans to be a series of Convênios de Cooperação (ANA, 2003, 2004) 
through which the agency will delegate some of its responsibilities to state agencies, especially water use 
permits for federal waters. In most cases, ANA plans to establish the agreements only after the 
implementation of an institutional support program to create or strengthen state agencies. The new policy 
will likely have a major political impact on the national water resource system, especially since many 
state governments feared that the creation of ANA signaled a new process of centralization of decision-
making about federal waters (Formiga-Johnsson and Scatasta, forthcoming). 
20 These conclusions are based on interviews in February and July 2004 and are confirmed by Lemos and 
Oliveira (2004) who discuss this issue in length. -  -  27
8.3. Central-Local Relationships and Capacities 
The devolution of some of DNOCS’s authority over the management and control of 
reservoirs to Ceará state has been highly effective, since COGERH has developed 
substantial technical, administrative and financial management capacities. Currently, 
COGERH operates and manages, through its agreement with DNOCS, all major 
reservoirs in the state, accounting for over 90% of the state’s water storage. But other 
aspects of water management remain underdeveloped. The state has proceeded only 
slowly with the implementation of groundwater management. The development of a new 
water use permit system has also been slow, despite the fact that criteria and procedures 
were basically defined some time ago. A recent World Bank study characterized the 
permit system as still in consolidation (Baltar, Azevedo, Rêgo and Porto, 2003). It should 
be taken into account, however, that making water rights into a full-fledged instrument of 
water management, as proposed by the current reforms, is a major challenge, since until 
recently, water permits were no more than a bureaucratic instrument. In short, for 
climatic and even cultural reasons, the state so far has privileged reservoir operation and 
water allocation over other important issues such as the implementation of water use 
permits, the extension of bulk water charges to the irrigation sector and the management 
and control of groundwater use.  
  While federal-to-state decentralization has undoubtedly advanced substantially, 
the process of devolving authority and responsibility from the state to local levels is less 
easy to characterize in terms of success or failure.  
  The basin committees —which were supposed to be the most important basin 
institution — can be characterized as formal institutions that still have not found a de 
facto place in the water management system. On paper, they have many competencies. In 
practice, however, they are unable to carry out most of them, since they lack effective 
technical, administrative and financial support. Contrary to the national framework, 
which places river basin committees and agencies at the heart of decision-making about 
water pricing, Ceará has centralized water charging at the state level. This means that, in 
Ceará, basin committees will not have their own executive arm (basin agencies), nor will 
they have financial resources of their own. With most of their expenses provided by 
members themselves or by the occasional financial support of COGERH, the committees 
still have little influence over water resource management. Their activities have been 
limited to information dissemination, awareness raising and capacity building among 
local actors and the resolution of water use conflicts. Contrary to what the state water law 
proposes, major structural projects continue to be decided solely by the state government, 
especially with respect to supplying water to Fortaleza. A COGERH plan is being 
formulated which will define an executive support structure to replace the partial 
technical support that its regional offices have been providing the committees thus far. 
But COGERH has apparently yet to define both its own role in the basin’s institutional 
set-up and the relationship it should have with either the committees or users’ 
commissions. Importantly, in addition to the political change in leadership in the state and 
its agencies, such as COGERH, the agency has also come under tremendous pressure 
with the creation of the National Water Agency ANA. At least 80% of the most 
competent staff of the State of Ceará in the area of water resources management have left 
the state and are now employed at the national level. This is in part due to the significant -  -  28
efforts of the Federal Government in the recruitment of the well-recognized staff of Ceará 
and partly due to the dissatisfaction of the staff with the new policy directions. 
  Conversely, decentralization in the Jaguaribe Basin has gone furthest with the 
user commissions, especially through the negotiated allocation of water, which, as 
discussed above, has proven very effective (Garjulli, 2001; Formiga-Johnsson, 2001; 
Garjulli, Oliveira, Cunha et ali., 2003; Lemos and Oliveira, 2004; Ballestero, 2004; and 
Formiga-Johnsson and Scatasta, forthcoming). However, within COGERH and the SRH 
(to which COGERH is subordinate) there has been resistance to giving decentralized 
bodies greater power over water management. The result is that only the sub-basin 
committees have been legally created, but these have received little real support or 
authority.  Meanwhile the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission —where the process 
of participatory decision-making began and has continued with great intensity — is still 
only an informal institution. This contradictory situation has created tensions between the 
sub-basin committees and the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission, as will be 
discussed in the next section. Uncertainties thus prevail about the real extent and 
intentions of the devolution of authority and responsibilities from the state to local level 
in Ceará. However, the importance of negotiated water allocation in the Jaguaribe basin 
and its national and even international prestige, may assure the continuity of this process.   
  Finally, we should note that the transformation of water management practices in 
Ceará seems to need more time to reach full implementation. Certainly, reform is still 
underway in the Jaguaribe Basin. Considering that the process is already ten years old, 
this suggests that there are significant transaction costs in terms of time, even in one of 
the most advanced cases of water reform in Brazil. 
8.4. Internal Basin-Level Institutional Arrangements 
Water allocation is the most prestigious activity in the basin, with the greatest local 
impact and hence the greatest capacity to mobilize local actors. This importance has 
recently led some representatives of the Executive Board of most sub-basin committees 
to argue that the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valley Commission should be dismantled, with the 
transfer of its responsibilities to the committees, as occurred in Ceará’s Curu River 
Basin.
21 This would involve a fundamental rearrangement in basin institutions, since four 
of the five sub-basin committees are involved with the regulated valleys. In the Curu 
basin, the transfer of power from commission to committee was simpler because the 
territorial jurisdiction of the user commission fell entirely within the geographical area of 
a single committee. 
  However, before rethinking the competencies of these local bodies and their 
relations with each other, it is necessary to determine the extent to which decentralization 
down to units that are smaller than the river basin has been positive. The division of the 
Jaguaribe into three parts (upper, middle and lower) has no correspondence either to 
hydrological criteria or to any pre-existing social, economic or environmental form of 
organization. When the committees were created, the decision to divide them this way 
                                                 
21 The tension between the sub-basin committees and the main valley commission in the Jaguaribe Basin 
were strongly noted during field work in February and July 2004.  -  -  29
was based on logistical and operational criteria, since COGERH’s Department of User 
Organization was unable to operate immediately in the entire basin. The solution was to 
create committees in sub-basins in the short run, with the plan to join them together later 
into a single committee. Some still support this plan, while others have proposed creating 
a separate basin-wide committee whose objective would be to coordinate decisions made 
by the smaller scale bodies and, principally, to take over the water allocation 
responsibilities currently held by the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú User Commission. 
  While the committees and the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú User Commission are sources 
of controversy, all actors in the basin and at the state level have shown support for the 36 
reservoir user commissions. The allocation process they engage in is similar to that 
carried out by the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission, but the decisions have only 
very localized impact and transaction costs are lower. Usually, the commissions include 
only users or groups of users directly affected by water allocations in the area of 
hydrological influence of a single reservoir,  since members are mostly made up of 
organizations working in the perimeter of the reservoirs, and in the immediate 
downstream area. Despite the current uncertainties concerning institutional boundaries, 
both user commissions and basin committees have been promoting the resolution of 
water use conflicts, with the support of COGERH. They have come to be perceived as the 
legitimate space for negotiating conflicts in terms of water allocation and quantitative 
use, and for airing other controversial issues related to water quality and environmental 
degradation.  
9. Performance Assessment 
Evaluating the performance of river basin management institutions should focus on three 
critical characteristics of effective decentralization, i.e. devolution of authority, 
stakeholder participation, and financial self-sufficiency, as well as on the actual physical 
changes that have occurred due to the changes in decision making – e.g. more efficient, 
effective and equitable water allocation, decrease in flooding events and/or their impacts, 
and environmental quality of the water body.  In the following sections, we will briefly 
explore each of these characteristics with respect to the Jaguaribe River Basin experience. 
9.1. Devolution of Authority 
As should be clear by now, the devolution of federal authority over the management and 
operation of federal reservoirs to Ceará State has been highly effective. Federal 
institutions continue to develop, support and finance specific drought relief programs in 
the semi-arid region, together with state governments and sometimes with international 
organizations. The Águas do Vale Program (see section 7), which can be considered a 
demand-supply approach for irrigation, is an example of such partnerships. 
  Decentralization from state to local level has been more partial. Although 
COGERH has decentralized the allocation of strategic reservoir waters to local 
institutions, many traditional water management competencies continue under 
COGERH’s purview, such as water permit concession, bulk water pricing, planning, 
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control, etc. Furthermore, none of the changes introduced thus far have affected 
municipalities, which are still fully responsible for land use and urban drainage. 
9.2. Stakeholder Participation 
The creation of sub-basin committees and user commissions, under COGERH’s 
coordination with the support of the State Water Resources Secretariat, has allowed for 
the involvement of hundreds of stakeholders of all types, such as municipalities, public 
and large private irrigators, fishermen, and industry leaders. Although so far stakeholder 
involvement has been limited largely to the negotiated allocation of water and to conflict 
resolution, these experiences are still a radical transformation in management practices. 
Also, the participatory nature of the process appears to increase users’ sense of 
ownership, that is, they are not only users, but also managers and “stewards” of the 
resource.   
  However, local stakeholders still have no say in some decision-making processes 
that affect them directly, such as bulk water pricing or inter-basin transfers to Greater 
Fortaleza, which continue solely under the control of state government agencies. In this 
sense, the decentralization proposed in the state water law was not translated into 
practice. Also, the concerns of local stakeholders with respect to water quality problems 
and broader environmental problems related to water have yet to find a place on the 
agenda of the state water institutions. 
9.3. Financial Self-Sufficiency 
At the basin level, the financial resources of decentralized institutions are both precarious 
and insecure. Neither the basin committees nor user commissions have their own 
financial resources, depending totally on contributions from the state government and 
from their own members. This makes them vulnerable to any top-down changes that may 
occur. 
  At the state level, though, bulk water pricing has represented an important change 
in terms of financing water management. Until pricing was introduced, bulk water supply 
services were partially or fully subsidized by public institutions. The pricing system has 
enabled COGERH to gradually achieve financial sustainability for its operation and 
maintenance costs and for investments in new water infrastructure (Azevedo and Asad, 
2000). Although Ceará is one of Brazil's poorest states, collected revenues, state-wide, 
have grown substantially over time, from R$ 268,410 (US$ 103,235) in 1996 to about 
R$ 10,000,000 (US$ 3.85 million) in 2003.
22  Payment reached 83% of the total revenues 
in 2003, when 10 of the expected 12 million reais were actually collected.  
  The Metropolitan Basin —the state’s principal urban and industrial area—
contributes over 90% of the total revenues from bulk water pricing. Among the user-
payers, the domestic sector is currently the largest contributor (65% of the total), 
followed by industry (34%). Irrigation contributed only 1% of the total collected 
revenues. The result is that the degree of cross-subsidization within the state for water 
                                                 
22  US$ 1 = R$ 2.6 (April 2005). -  -  31
management costs is enormous, both among user sectors (from industries to the domestic 
and irrigation sectors) and regionally (from the metropolitan basin to the other basins). 
This means that the operation and maintenance costs of the large water infrastructure in 
the Jaguaribe River Basin are currently subsidized by users in the Metropolitan Basin. It 
is likely that even with the expansion of the bulk water pricing system, expected to begin 
in 2005, proceeds generated within the basin will still be insufficient for the investments 
in infrastructure and water monitoring that are planned. In effect, most of the water 
basin’s users are irrigators who pay almost symbolic amounts. Therefore, we can expect 
both continued subsidization from the Metropolitan region and government funding for 
larger infrastructure projects to be necessary.   
8.4. Changes in Riverbasin Management Outcomes – Strengths and Weaknesses of the 
Institutional Arrangements in the Jaguaribe River Basin Case 
Water Allocation. Compared to the allocation process followed by DNOCS in the 
decades before COGERH took over, the water allocation process has become both more 
effective, more efficient and more equitable. Nowadays water users are convened every 
year after the rainy season and informed about water availability, including stochastic 
model results for the coming year. This is the foundation of the negotiated allocation 
process, which permits water users to plan their production accordingly once the shares 
of each one have been agreed.  
  The process is not only more efficient, but also more equitable because also 
traditionally weak user groups are included, get access to information and have a kind of 
informal water right. This system considerably reduced the moral hazard approach in 
which DNOCS would keep information to itself and supply water users —usually the 
well-connected ones— to its liking. The negotiated water sharing system also permits 
water users to avoid the impacts of dry years and thus become more drought resistant.   
  That said, the fact that the Jaguaribe basin is viewed as the “water cow” that will 
supply water to the ever growing state capital region, is stressing the new arrangements, 
which is leading to the increased efforts regarding water trading described above.  
Flooding. With the completion of Castanhão reservoir in 2002, the cities located near the 
Jaguaribe river, especially in the lower part of the basin, gained greater protection against 
flooding, as the heavy rainy season of 2004 proved.  
Environment. Water management in the Jaguaribe Basin, and Ceará more generally, has, 
thus far, focused on improving water infrastructure and optimizing use and allocation, the 
privileged arenas of hydrological engineering. Broadening the scope of river basin 
management to include, for example, water quality management, ecosystem preservation 
and other environmental issues, has yet to come. Despite these concerns, it seems that the 
most pressing agenda for stakeholders in the basin is not to expand the scope of the water 
resources management system, but rather to consolidate the advances made thus far. 
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8.5. Other Perspectives on the Decentralization Process in the Jaguaribe Basin – The 
Way Forward 
First, policy makers have to establish how negotiated water allocation fits into the formal 
institutional arrangements for water resources management. Proposals for the 
combination of inter-annual permits (issued by the state) and annual negotiations to 
determine the available amount under rationing conditions (decided informally by the 
user commissions) seems to be a good way to adapt water allocation policy to the specific 
conditions of the semi-arid region. This would eliminate the contradiction between a 
formal, but weak, system and an informal but highly legitimate one.  
  Secondly, the state government has yet to overcome the skepticism of the 
irrigation sector with respect to the bulk water pricing system. The expansion of the 
charging system, currently under way, has been criticized by local stakeholders, who 
complain that COGERH and the state government have made unilateral decisions, with 
little debate with Basin committees.  
  Many of these problems are, however, the result of the fact that the state has failed 
to demonstrate clarity and certainty with respect to the level of decentralization to be 
pursued in the water management system. Indeed, COGERH has yet to define both its 
own role in basin organization and the relationship it should have with basin committees 
and user commissions. Some argue that if the system is to be made compatible with the 
spirit of the water laws, that is, if it is to become more decentralized and participatory, 
COGERH’s current policies towards the basin-scale institutions would have to be 
reformulated substantially (Teixeira 2004). Above all, COGERH will have to decide if it 
will become a water agency for all the state’s basins, instead of serving as only a sort of 
occasional support mechanism. If it chooses to take this path, it will need first to build 
legitimacy and this will require breaking with traditions of closed-door decision-making 
and centralized administration, especially with respect to bulk water pricing. It will then 
have to adopt mechanisms gradually leading to a system in which management 
responsibilities are shared with those who pay for bulk water use and in which the 
committees have deliberative power and can supervise its activities. But the recent 
dismantling of the Department of User Organization – which has functioned to date as the 
main liaison between COGERH and local organizations – sends a signal in the opposite 
direction.  
  The success that has made the Ceará model so famous in Brazil and 
internationally has depended on two factors: the capacities and expertise of COGERH 
and the involvement and mobilization of local stakeholders. But not only are COGERH 
and local stakeholders in constant tension and even competition, but also the various 
stakeholder bodies that have been created have yet to establish a clear division of labor. 
Consolidating Ceará’s success will depend on finding the right balance between these 
forces. 
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10. Conclusions 
The case study of the Jaguaribe River Basin is a fascinating example of integrated water 
resources management at the lowest appropriate level. In the first place, it suggests that 
even when pre-existing conditions are almost entirely unfavorable, changes leading to 
more integrated and decentralized practices are possible. The analytical framework 
developed for the larger World Bank research project of which this case study is part 
(section 2) would suggest that the political and institutional situation of Ceará and the 
Jaguaribe basin (sections 8 e 9) was largely adverse to the increase of stakeholder 
involvement and transparency in decision-making. But when the decentralization model 
was tailored to these conditions, it was possible to begin to overcome them.  
  A second issue that this paper has brought up has to do with how change occurs. 
What happened in the 1990s that made it possible to transform practices that had been 
operating for decades? Water scarcity and conditions of almost permanent rationing 
certainly were motivations for change. But these conditions existed before. Perhaps more 
important were the national post-dictatorship context —highly favorable to 
democratization and decentralization— and the fact that a reform movement within the 
water resources sector began to promote integrated, participatory and economically 
sustainable management throughout the country in the 1980s. Both of these conditions, 
however, could describe all Brazilian states, most of which did not make the advances in 
decentralized water management that we have described in Brazil. Certain conditions 
specific to the Ceará context facilitated the adoption of the reform proposals in that state. 
A combination of an innovative state government, with an entrepreneurial orientation, 
and strong long-term support from the World Bank for reform in the water sector were 
critical for putting water security and management made on the top of that state’s 
political agenda.  
  The high incidence of poverty in Ceará, its regional disparities, the limited 
capacity of user sectors to pay for water and the high cost of bulk water supply have, 
however, meant that Ceará’s law does not entirely correspond to the decentralization 
model that was later developed in the federal legislation and most state laws. That model 
is centered around the creation of river basin committees and basin agencies with 
financial sustainability guaranteed through bulk water pricing. But in the Jaguaribe river 
basin – and in Ceará as a whole– the state government began to play a much more 
proactive role in water resources management, primarily through COGERH. In a sense, 
the adaptation made in the Ceará case was simply less decentralization from the state to 
local levels than the national model and even the state’s own water law proposed.  The 
presence of large hydraulic works throughout the state, which must be operated in close 
coordination if recurrent droughts are to be dealt with effectively, justifies this more 
centralized system. Moreover, the fact that the metropolitan area is dependent on the 
Jaguaribe basin, and will become even more so in the future, means that few at state level 
defend full decentralization.  Water from the Jaguaribe basin is diverted not only to 
protect the city from domestic supply crises but also to guarantee steady economic 
growth.  State politicians thus fear that if water allocation were fully the responsibility of 
each river basin body, the largest city in the state would risk losing access to the water 
from other basins that is essential for its dynamism. At the same time, what is particularly 
interesting about this approach is that water management is more centralized in Ceará -  -  34
than elsewhere, local mobilization and stakeholder involvement is also more intense than 
anywhere else in Brazil.  
  A third conclusion of this paper is that the “lowest appropriate level” for 
decentralization is not always the river basin. As fora for negotiated allocation and 
conflict resolution, the user commissions serve as strong building blocks for integrated 
management. The sub-basin committees are still trying to define their roles and powers. 
Their creation, however, is a consensus at local level and they have increasingly 
mobilized local actors around water issues. The essence of Ceará’s experience in the 
Jaguaribe River Basin may thus be that the river basin scale is less relevant there for 
integrated water management purposes, in favor of combining state level management 
with decision-making at smaller territorial levels than the river basin, such as sub-basins, 
regulated river valleys, and reservoirs. This suggests that, although the principle of the 
river basin as a unit for decentralized management should be kept as a target, it must be 
tailored to each political and cultural context.   
  Finally, it should be stressed that much remains to be done, especially with 
respect to building a more holistic management system that incorporates efforts to 
promote better water quality and to coordinate water and environmental management. 
Nonetheless, the achievements made thus far are remarkable when compared to the 
problems and practices that seemed, until recently, impossible to overcome. Water 
rationing in the Jaguaribe Basin used to be an almost permanent state of affairs. 
Traditional institutions used to privilege the interests of entrenched oligarchies. Civil 
society and small users were excluded from water related decision-making. Water was, in 
general, managed and protected in only the most precarious and unsustainable of ways. 
All these unfavorable factors have been strongly challenged and will continue to 
challenge efforts to build a decentralized and integrated water resource management 
system in the Jaguaribe River Basin.  
  The achievements already made are thus quite impressive. It is too early, 
however, to establish firm conclusions about the political stability of the process. Only 
the future will tell if the 12-year long decentralization process described here, a process 
that was initiated and strongly supported by a succession of political leaders, and 
implemented by highly professional and dedicated staff, has yet been institutionalized 
enough to survive the current period of ‘political drought’ that started with the change in 
state and institutional leadership in 2003. -  -  35
Acronyms 
ABRH  Brazilian Water Resources Association  
(Associação Brasileira de Recursos Hídricos) 
ANA  National Water Agency (Agência Nacional de Águas): 
CAGECE  Ceará’s Water and Sanitation Company  
(Companhia de Água e Esgoto do Estado do Ceará) 
COGERH  Ceará’s Water Resources Management Agency  
(Companhia de Gestão dos Recursos Hídricos) 
DNOCS  National Department of Works Against Droughts  
(Departamento Nacional de Obras contra as Secas) 
DOU COGERH’s  User  Mobilization Department  
(Departamento do Organização de Usuários da COGERH), 
FNS  Federal Health Agency (Fundação Nacional de Saúde)  
FUNCEME  Ceará’s Foundation for Meteorology and Water Resources  
(Fundação Cearense de Metereologia e Recursos Hídricos) 
IBGE Brazilian  National  Statistical Agency  
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística)  
PROGERIRH Ceará Integrated Water Resources Management Project  
(Programa de Gerenciamento e Integração de Recursos Hídricos)  
PROURB  Ceará Urban Development and Water Resources Management Project  
(Projeto de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Gestão de Recursos Hídricos do 
Ceará)  
SEMACE  Ceará’s Environmental Agency  
(Superintendência Estadual do Meio Ambiente) 
SOHIDRA  Ceará’s Hydrological Works Superintendency 
(Superintendência de Obras Hidráulicas do Estado do Ceará) 
SRH/CE  Ceará’s Water Resources Secretariat  
(Secretaria Estadual de Recursos Hídricos do Estado do Ceará) 
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Appendix: Variables in the Analytical Framework 
As noted in Section 2, the analytical framework used for this research project entails 
several variables hypothesized to be related to the success or failure of river basin 
management institutions, grouped into four categories. 
 
Contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful 
decentralization is at least partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time 
a decentralization initiative is attempted.  These initial conditions are elements of the 
social context of the decentralization effort.  They include 
 
o  Economic development of the nation; 
o  Economic development of the basin area; 
o  Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
o  Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders. 
 
Characteristics of the decentralization process 
In countries that have attempted to decentralize water resource management to the basin 
level, characteristics of the decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for 
successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are 
(a) devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of that 
authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) occur will 
depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  Important factors 
include 
 
o  Whether basin-level management was a local initiative to assume management 
responsibilities, a devolution that was mutually desired by local stakeholders and 
central government officials, or a decision by central government officials to shed 
water resource management responsibilities regardless of whether basin 
stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
o  The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin governance; 
and, 
o  Whether central government officials maintained a policy commitment to 
decentralization and basin management through transitions in central government 
administration.\ 
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Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to condition that success.  Political and institutional variables should be 
explored that relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-
level stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include 
o  The extent to which devolution of water management responsibilities from central 
government to basin institutions has been real or merely rhetorical, and whether 
devolution has been handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as 
an abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
o  The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the extent of their 
financial autonomy; 
o  Basin management participants’ ability to create and modify institutional 
arrangements that are tailored to their needs and circumstances; 
o  The extent of other experience at the local or regional level within the country 
with self-governance and service provision; 
o  The distribution (particularly asymmetries) of national-level political influence 
among basin stakeholders; 
o  Characteristics of the water rights system in the country which facilitate or hinder 
basin management efforts; and 
o  Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for implementation and 
adaptation of basin management activities. 
 
The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials.  Important ones include 
 
o  The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
o  The extent of clarity of institutional boundaries, and their match with basin 
boundaries; 
o  Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements recognize sub-
watershed communities of interest; 
o  The availability of forums for information sharing and communication among 
basin stakeholders; 
o  The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts whereby basin 
stakeholders can agree to contribute to improvements in basin conditions; -  -  42
o  The institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions by means that 
are trusted by water users; and 
o  The availability of forums for conflict resolution. 
 
Certainly, these factors will not all apply with equal significance in all cases.  In 
each case, the emergence and path of river basin management will be affected profoundly 
by some of these variables, affected slightly by others, and not at all by some.   
Institutional analysis in a case-study setting consists largely in determining which 
institutional factors in what combination appear to have been linked to outcomes.   
Furthermore, many of the variables listed above have subjective components, and will be 
assessed differently by different participants and observers.  It is therefore essential in 
these case studies that team members interview individuals with a variety of perspectives. 
 